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Abstract: We use a nationally representative household survey to estimate returns to 
schooling in Venezuela from instrumental variables based on a supply-side intervention 
in the education market. These estimates apply to a subgroup of liquidity-constrained 
individuals, in the spirit of the local average treatment effect (LATE) literature. Returns 
to schooling estimates that apply to a subgroup of individuals affected by the policy 
intervention may be more interesting from a policy perspective than the return to the 
“average” individual. We use an instrument based on the 1980 education reform (the 
Organic Law of Education), which provided for nine years of compulsory basic 
education. Alternative estimates using father’s education as an instrument are also 
obtained in an attempt to derive high and low estimates of returns to schooling in 
Venezuela. The estimates are consistent with recent findings suggesting that the effect of 
education, at least for certain subgroups affected by policy intervention, is as large as or 
larger than what is suggested by ordinary least squares estimates. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The rate of return to schooling has been of special interest from the standpoint of 
public policy, as the large number of past theoretical and empirical studies shows. Recent 
empirical studies that rely on theoretical advances that improved the understanding of 
crucial endogeneity and heterogeneity issues in the returns to education literature have 
almost exclusively used data from developed countries. However, from a policy 
perspective, evidence on developing countries would be valuable in assessing the 
effectiveness of education policies, especially when the focus of the policy maker is a 
section of the population, such as those who are liquidity constrained. As the interest in 
economics moves away from the effect of policies on the average individual and toward 
their effect on subsections of the population, research on returns to schooling in 
developing countries needs to focus on identifying the effects of education initiatives 
(such as compulsory schooling reforms, free education at certain levels, and accessibility 
to schools) on the disadvantaged, rather than the average individual. 
 
  A variety of empirical studies, mainly for developed countries, have used supply-
side institutional features of the education system (such as compulsory schooling laws 
and accessibility of schools, among others) as instruments in instrumental variables (IV) 
estimations of the returns to schooling. The main finding is that such estimates of returns 
to schooling are typically larger than ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates.  Card 
(2001) interprets this finding as suggesting that the marginal returns among the low-
education subgroups (which are typically affected by supply-side interventions) tend to 
be relatively high, reflecting their high marginal costs of schooling rather than low 
ability.   2 
 
  In the presence of individual heterogeneity, OLS estimates are subject to 
traditional ability bias, due to the correlation between the ability component of the 
intercept of the earnings function and the marginal cost of schooling. If, in addition, there 
is heterogeneity in the slopes of the earnings function across individuals, individuals with 
a higher return to schooling have an incentive to acquire more schooling, resulting in  
upward-biased estimates of returns from an OLS regression.  This endogeneity bias (also 
known as comparative advantage bias), is larger when the comparative advantage 
incentives are more important.  On the other hand, errors in the measurement of the 
schooling variable would lead to a downward bias in the OLS estimate of the returns to 
schooling.  Instrumental variables estimates in the presence of measurement error in the 
schooling variable are consistent, provided that the measurement error encountered is a 
classical one – schooling variable measured with additive random errors.  If the 
measurement error does not satisfy the classical assumptions, then IV estimates will be 
biased either upward or downward (Kane and others 1999). 
 
In using the IV method to measure the “true” effect of education
1 using cross-
sectional data, one needs an observable covariate that affects schooling but is 
uncorrelated with ability. Various variables on family background are frequently used.  
However, they are not expected to meet the requirement that they are uncorrelated with 
ability (among other possible reasons, due to inter-generational effects). Recently, 
                                                 
1 As stated later on in this paper, one cannot talk of “the causal” effect of schooling from IV; different 
instruments (such as policy based instruments) result in different interpretations of the return estimate.   3 
supply-side sources of identifying information, such as various types of education reform, 
are increasingly sought after. 
 
  Considering one or more observable variables, Zi (such as exposure to different 
education system regimes) and assuming that there is heterogeneity in the returns to 
schooling (affecting the slope of the earnings function, in addition to the intercept), 
consistent estimation of the average return to schooling requires the assumption that Zi is 
independent of individual ability and the reduced form schooling residual (Heckman and 
Vytlacil 1999).  If these conditions are not satisfied, then one must be careful in 
interpreting the instrumental variables estimates. In particular, and borrowing 
terminology from the literature on “treatment” effects, violation of these restrictive 
assumptions does not allow interpreting the IV estimates as the average “effect of 
treatment on the treated” (Heckman 1997). Furthermore, it may not be of particular 
interest to estimate the average return to education, as changes in education policies tend 
to target only certain population subgroups. 
 
In this study, we interpret the IV results from using supply-side intervention and 
parent background instruments along the lines of the local average treatment effect 
(LATE) theoretical and empirical literature (see, for example, Imbens and Angrist 1994; 
Angrist, Imbens and Rubin 1996; Ichino and Winter-Ebmer 1998). In this context, IV 
estimates of the returns to schooling using, say, a compulsory education reform as 
instrument, would be interpreted as the average return to schooling for an individual who 
acquired an additional year of education as a result of the reform. This LATE would be   4 
different from either the effect of the reform on the random person, or its effect on the 
“treated.” 
 
There are very few studies for developing countries dealing with the issues 
surrounding the endogeneity of education and the implications of estimating returns to 
education from instrumental variables; exceptions are the studies by Maluccio (1997) and 
DuFlo (2001). Maluccio’s study for the Philippines uses distance to the nearest high 
school as the main instrument (in some specifications supplemented with parental 
education and wealth). His study, however, uses panel data from Bicol region in the rural 
Philippines (one of the poorest in the country and, therefore, not representative) and relies 
on 250 or less observations for estimation of returns to schooling from instrumental 
variables.  DuFlo (2001), on the other hand, uses a set of unique data and examines the 
effects of the schooling construction programs in Indonesia on education and earnings. 
Using the variation in schooling generated by the policy as instrumental variables, she 
generates estimates of economic returns to education ranging from 6.8 to 10.6 percent. 
 
2.  Education in Venezuela 
The issue of free, public and compulsory education at the primary level in 
Venezuela first arose during the independence struggle.  Simon Bolívar – the liberator of 
Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Peru and Venezuela – having lived in France, was 
greatly influenced by the French educational system (such as the centralization and rigid 
structure of curricula), and issued a series of decrees concerning free education. The real 
beginning of free public education, however, did not come until 1870, when then 
President Antonio Guzmán Blanco issued a decree in which he recognized compulsory   5 
elementary mass education as the responsibility of the national, state and local 
governments. But these ambitious beginnings came to an abrupt halt 
(http://reference.allrefer.com/country-guide-study/). 
 
The return of democratic government in 1958 brought leaders committed to 
improving both the quantity and the quality of educational opportunities. In fact, it is 
generally acknowledged that it was only after 1958 that the ideals and goals of Guzmán 
Blanco began to be systematically pursued. 
  
At least six years of primary school were compulsory until 1980 in Venezuela, 
when the Organic Law of Education was passed. This law provided for compulsory 
preschool education and nine years of basic education.  Basic education consisted of nine 
years of compulsory schooling for children 6 to 14 years of age. For those continuing 
their education, the system offered two years of diversified academic, technical and 
vocational study at a senior high school, which could be followed by various types of 
higher education – junior college, university or technical institute. 
 
Overall, Venezuela was among the most literate of the Latin American countries. 
The literacy rate among Venezuelans 15 years of age and older was 88 percent as early as 
in 1985.  The government distributed training materials such as books and tapes 
throughout the country in an effort to encourage those who could read and write to assist 
illiterates in acquiring these skills. 
   6 
Venezuela's education system, as measured by the number of schools, teachers 
and size of enrollment, expanded rapidly in the 1970s and 1980s.  Enrollments at all 
levels increased substantially, as did the numbers of schools and teachers at each level. 
Primary enrollments rose by over 30 percent and secondary by over 50 percent, while 
university-level enrollments nearly doubled, the latter a reflection not only of population 
growth but also of the opening of new schools and the easing of entrance requirements. 
 
  It is the 1980 reform which extended compulsory schooling from 6 to 9 years that 
is used here as the natural policy experiment.  Compulsory schooling is thus used as the 
instrument in the subsequent analysis. 
 
3.  Methodology and Diagnostic Testing 
Methodology.  Within the general returns model, and given an instrument, Zi, the 
coefficient, bi, is meant to capture the individual idiosyncratic gain and has a population 
mean, b0. Using IV estimation, even in the homogeneous returns model, we need the 
instrument to satisfy the orthogonality conditions; that is, that the instrument is 
uncorrelated with ability and the error term. 
 
In the heterogeneous model, however, satisfying the orthogonality conditions is 
not enough. An additional property is required; namely, that for the treated, the 
instrument Z is not correlated with the individual-specific component of the return, bi 
(conditional on the observable regressors). Then we can recover the conditional effect of 
the treatment on the treated (ATT). However, the additional assumption is strong: while   7 
allowing for heterogeneous returns, bi, it requires schooling decisions to be unrelated to 
these individual gains (for a detailed discussion, see Blundell and others 2003). 
 
When β varies in the population, the return to schooling is a random variable and 
there is a distribution of causal effects, and different causal effects answer different 
questions. There are various ways to summarize this distribution of returns and, in 
general, no single statistic will capture all aspects of the distribution.  Different summary 
measures include the average treatment effect (ATE), the treatment on the treated (TT), 
and treatment on the untreated (TUT).  With heterogeneous returns, however, when 
individuals (partially) anticipate β, none of the treatment parameters identifies the “causal 
effect” of education. 
 
Consider a model with two potential outcomes with respect to earnings (lnY0 and 
lnY1), a vector of individual characteristics (X) and potential outcomes generated by two 
random variables (U0, U1) instead of one (common coefficient model). Following 
Hecknam and Vytlacil (1999, 2000) and Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil (2003): 
 lnY1 = µ1(X, U1) and lnY0 = µ0(X, U0).          (1) 
Enrollment in school is determined by the rule: 
S = 1 if µS(X, Z) – US > 0                  (2) 
where Z is a vector of instrumental variables that influence the decision to enroll in 
school but not the potential outcomes. In the above, Z, X are observed, while (U1, U0, Us) 
are unobserved, and the vector Z may include components of X. 
   8 
Heckman and Vytlacil (2000; 2004) and Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil (2003) 
show how, under certain assumptions, the conventional IV estimates of returns to 
schooling relate to various treatment parameters and what policy questions IV estimation 
answers.  The required assumptions are: (a) µS(Z) is a non-degenerate random variable 
conditional on X, which postulates the existence of a variable or set of variables that are 
in Z but not in X; (b) the distribution of U’S  is absolutely continuous; (c) (U0, U1, Us) is 
independent of Z conditional on X;  (d) lnY0 and lnY1 have finite first moments. This is 
necessary for the definition of the mean parameters; and (e) 1 > Pr(S = 1 | X) > 0, which 
ensures that, at least in very large samples for each X there will be individuals with S=1 
as well as individuals with S=0.  
 
Besides the above testable assumptions, we need that the monotonicity restriction 
is satisfied. Given the events: D1i = {S1i | Zi = 1} and D0i = {S1i | Zi = 0}, this requires 
that the instrument has the same directional effect on all those whose behavior it changes 
(i.e., [D1i  ≥  D0i] or  [D1i  ≤  D0i ]. This restriction is not testable, and its validity needs to 
be argued in the context of a particular application (Imbens and Angrist 1994). 
 
Vytlacil (2002) shows that the model of equations (1) and (2), along with the 
above conditions is equivalent to the local average treatment effect (LATE) model of 
Imbens and Angrist (1994).  Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2000) show that, under the 
stated conditions, the various treatment parameters are different weighted averages of the 
marginal treatment effect (MTE), where the weights sum up to one. 
   9 
Consider now a policy related instrument (such as one based on compulsory 
schooling). Compulsory schooling is frequently viewed as an ideal instrument (Angrist 
and Krueger 1991). However, when returns are heterogeneous, and when individuals 
making decisions about schooling act on this heterogeneity of returns, using the 
compulsory schooling instrument identifies only one of the possible treatment 
parameters; namely, the return to persons who decide to enroll only because of the policy 
change. Different policies, therefore, define different instrumental variables. It is useful 
to note, however, that if the instrument is the same as the policy being studied and the 
policy is exogenously imposed, the instrument can identify the effect of the exogenously 
imposed policy on the outcome being studied. 
 
Diagnostic Testing.  In testing the relevance and validity of instruments we 
essentially test that the instruments are correlated with the included endogenous 
variable(s) and orthogonal to the error process. The degree of correlation to the 
endogenous variables is easily tested by examining the fit of the first-stage regression 
after the included instruments are “partialled-out” (Bound and others 1995) and the F-test 
associated with it.  If the explanatory power in the first stage is positive but, nevertheless, 
weak, then this is cause for concern (Staiger and Stock 1997; Baum and others 2003). In 
order to ascertain the independence of instruments from the unobservable error process, 
with an overidentified equation and given L instruments, o n e  n e e d s  t o  t e s t  t h e  
corresponding orthogonality conditions arising from the L instruments using tests such as  
Sargan’s (1958) statistic – a special case of the J-statistic of Hansen (1982) –, and in the 
presence of heteroskedastic errors, a “robust” Sargan’s statistic. However, all the 
equations that are estimated in this paper are exactly identified.   10  
 
Finally, in testing for the consequences of employing the estimation method of 
instrumental variables (test of the endogeneity or exogeneity of regressors), one 
acknowledges the trade-off between a possibly biased and inconsistent OLS estimator 
and the higher asymptotic variance of the IV estimator. The test employed here is the 
Durbin (1954)-Wu (1973)-Hausman (1978) version of the Hausman statistic, using the 
OLS estimate of the error variance, as opposed to the IV estimate.
2 
 
4.  Data and Results 
Data.  We use cross-sectional data from the 2000 Encuesta de Hogares por 
Muestro conducted by the National Statistical Office of Venezuela (OCEI). The working 
sub-sample is of male children of the head of household, working for wages and between 
the ages of 15 and 65. The use of only male wage and salary earners, as in some other 
studies, was decided in order to avoid complications due to gender issues. Using only 
children of the head of household allows the inclusion of father’s education and/or 
occupation in the earning function specifications.  
   
The dichotomous instrument, Zi, arising from the 1980 compulsory education 
reform was constructed by identifying the age in year 2000 (year of the survey) of those 
individuals who would have been affected by the reform. Given the year of initiation of 
the reform, affected individuals (Zi=1) are taken to be those who in year 2000 were in the 
15-32 age bracket. Experimentation showed that a dichotomous instrument thus defined  
                                                 
2  Under the null hypothesis both estimates are consistent, but the OLS estimate is more efficient.     
Furthermore, the chosen flavor of the test has the additional advantage of performing better when the 
instruments are weak (Staiger and Stock 1997; Baum and others 2003). 
   11  
correlates better with schooling, compared to using different cutoff points. Similarly, the 
use of a dichotomous instrument, thus defined, in the IV regressions results in higher 
precision of the schooling coefficient estimates, compared to definitions using a different 
cutoff point.  
 
Estimation and interpretation of results.  Preliminary evidence on the time trends 
of the returns to schooling in Venezuela, using OLS,  seems to document falling returns 
to schooling until the mid-1990s, followed by slightly increasing returns thereafter 
(Patrinos and Sakellariou 2004).  OLS estimates of overall returns to an additional year of 
schooling were about 8 percent in 2000. 
 
The estimated (OLS) schooling equations are presented in Table 1.  In column (1) 
the covariates are only the binary “compulsory schooling” dummy and the trend in 
secondary enrollments in Venezuela.  Column (2) includes other covariates but omits age 
and its square.  Finally, column (3) includes all covariates. The results show that, after 
controlling for age and its square, as well as the trend in secondary enrollments and other 
characteristics, individuals (male children of the head of household) who were affected 
by the reform, consistently, have one more year of schooling, and the beneficial effect 
does not distinguish between family backgrounds.  These results suggest that the 
“monotonicity” assumption is satisfied.  One should also note, however, that if the 
identification assumption – namely that there is no other major reason why the cohorts 
affected by the reform would have different earnings than cohorts which are not affected, 
except for their having higher years of schooling (after controlling for a quadratic in age   12  
and the other control variables) – this will lead to a bias in the estimated returns to 
education. 
 
Table 1: Schooling Equations, Venezuela, 2000 
Variable (1)  (2)  (3) 
Age        -  -  0.448 
 (6.1) 
Age






















0.174   
 (17.5) 
“Reform” dummy     1.243 






(’00 of thousand) 
   0.003 











“Reform”* Father White Collar 
 






Constant      4.838 








    0.030 





N 4,411  3,859  3,859 
 Source: Encuesta de Hogares por Muestro 
 Note: t-values in parentheses 
 
The estimation results for standard earnings functions using OLS are presented in 
Table 2.  Following standard practice, age is used instead of potential experience, as 
experience may be endogenous. Using OLS, the rate of return estimates for an additional 
year of schooling is 6 percent in the standard specification and 5.1 percent when, in 
addition, father’s years of education enters the equation. 
   13  
Table 2: Returns to Education from OLS Estimates: Venezuela, 2000 
Variable (1)  (2) 
Years of Schooling         0.060 
       (19.6) 
0.051 
(15.6) 
Age         0.065 




2        -0.0007 
       (6.2) 
-0.0008 
 (6.4) 
Log hours worked          0.434 
        (15.5) 
0.433 
 (15.6) 




Constant          8.535 




2 Adj.          0.247  0.254 
N 3,103  3,103 
Source: Encuesta de Hogares por Muestro 
Note: t-values in parentheses 
 
The IV estimation results, using the education reform and parental instruments, 
are presented in Table 3.  The sample consists of male children of the head of household. 
In columns (1) and (2) the reform instrument is used alone; in column (2), father’s years 
of education is an additional regressor. In column (3) the only instrument used is father’s 
years of schooling completed. In the next few paragraphs, before discussing the IV 
estimation results, we present the framework for interpretation of the results. 
 
Theory suggests that schooling choices are determined from a cost-benefit 
calculation, given alternative choices (see Angrist and Krueger 2001). Assuming 
heterogeneity in ability and schooling costs (for a discussion, see Card 2001; Ichino and 
Winter-Ebmer 1998; Angrist, Imbens and Rubin 1996; Imbens and Angrist 1994), 
consider the education reform of 1980 as instrument (labeling it Zi) which affects a subset 
of individuals in the sample. Denoting individual i’s marginal return to schooling by βi, 
the probability limit of the IV estimator using instrument Zi is: 
Plim βZi = Cov[log yi, Zi] / Cov[Si, Zi]    14  
or, 
) 0 | ( ) 1 | ( ) 0 | (log ) 1 | (log lim = − = = − = = Zi Si E Zi Si E Zi Yi E Zi Yi E P Zi β  
= Egp(βgp∆Sgp|Z) / Egp(∆Sgp|Z), 
 
with expectations taken over the joint distribution of the characteristics of the subgroups 
(gp). 
 
With heterogeneity in both marginal returns to schooling and marginal costs of 
schooling, the optimal amount of schooling and the marginal return to schooling differs 
across individuals, with the probability limit of the IV estimator given above determined 
by the weighted effects of the marginal returns to schooling of the various subgroups. 
 
  Assuming the existence of subgroups (of different size) with various ability-
discount rate combinations, that is, less well-off with high ability, well-off with low 
ability, and so on, if it can be determined which subgroup’s schooling decision is mainly 
affected by the reform (nine years of compulsory schooling), the IV estimate of returns to 
schooling using the education reform instrument could be considered a consistent 
estimate of the return for that group of compliers. Here it is argued that such a subgroup 
will mainly consist of liquidity constrained individuals (who probably are of relatively 
low ability), who would have chosen the lower level of education without the reform.  
The size of the group affected by the reform may be quite large, given that in a 
developing country the proportion of liquidity constrained individuals is expected to be 
large. 
   15  
Returns estimated using this instrument and attributed to such a group of 
individuals are expected to be fairly high, compared to returns that could be attributed to 
other subgroups of individuals with different average characteristics. 
 
  In search of an alternative subgroup with different characteristics, consider 
parents’ education as instruments (in this case, father’s years of completed education). It 
can be argued that predominantly those who are less liquidity constrained (and of below 
average ability) will be compliers; that is, they will change (increase) their level of 
schooling, since they may overcome their learning difficulties due to their family 
background (see Ichino and Winter-Ebmer 1998). On the other hand, those from such a 
family background who are of above average ability would have acquired more education 
even without highly educated parents (always takers); there may, however, be some 
compliers among those from such a family background who are liquidity constrained but 
are of high ability, although most are expected to be never-takers. 
 
As previously stated in the literature, using parental background instruments is 
likely to bias the average return to schooling upwards because, along with any 
independent causal effect of parental background on earnings, it is also expected that 
ability persists across generations. Therefore, although unaffected by the classical 
measurement error in the schooling variable, the probability limit of the IV return 
estimate is: 
Plim βF ≈ βgp + Bias. 
   16  
Here F stands for the family background instruments used. The potential bias is 
positive, due to the direct causal effect of parental background on earnings.  The true 
estimate of returns for this subgroup, which is expected to be lower than the one from 
using the “reform” instrument, is, therefore, expected to be even lower, further increasing 
the spread of estimates using different sets of instruments. 
 
With heterogeneous returns, therefore, the IV estimator using a binary treatment 
instrument (such as one based on an education policy reform), identifies the effect on 
those who ordinarily would not have obtained more schooling but did so as a result of the 
policy change.  
   
In columns (1) and (2) of Table 3, we instrument for schooling using the binary 
“reform” instrument.  The estimate of the returns to one additional year of schooling is 
approximately 12 percent in both columns (1) and (2), that is, close to double the 
corresponding OLS estimate, confirming the expectation of a high rate of return estimate. 
Based on Hausman tests, the hypothesis that the OLS and IV estimates differ is accepted 
at levels of significance of about 10 percent.  
  
Turning to column (3) of Table 3, IV estimates are derived using father’s years of 
completed schooling. The estimate of the return to schooling for the affected subgroup in 
the specification is now 9.5 percent, about 2.5 percent lower compared to that of the 
affected subgroup in the specification using the reform instrument, but still significantly 
higher than the corresponding OLS estimate. Hausman tests easily reject the hypotheses 
that the OLS and IV estimates do not differ.   17  













Years of Schooling       0.119 





Age       0.035 






2     -0.0003 





Log hours worked       0.442 











Constant       8.460 






2       0.152  0.132  0.213 
N 3,103  3,103  3,103 
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     0.002 
 
 
     8.3 











Pagan-Hall Test for 
Heteroskedasticity 
[p-value] 
    76.6 
 


























Source: Encuesta de Hogares por Muestro 
Notes: z-values in parentheses 
 
 
At least part of the difference in the rate of return between OLS and IV estimates 
using father’s education as instrument may be attributed to the bias from using family 
background instruments. The true estimate of the return to an additional year of schooling 
using father’s education as instrument may, therefore, be closer to the OLS estimate. 
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Finally, we considered the combination of the “reform” instrument with it’s 
interaction with father’s education as a set of instruments
3 (the main set of instruments in 
some other studies, such as in Denny and Harmon 2000).  The problem with this 
combination of instruments is that the estimates are compromised, as the instrument set is 
driven by father’s education (see also Card 2001).  The estimate of the return to schooling 
is 9.5 percent, which is very close to the average obtained from hundreds of studies 
reviewed in Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004). 
 
5. Conclusion 
We have used a supply-side intervention in the education market in Venezuela 
capable of generating significant changes in schooling.  Using an instrument based on 
this intervention, we generated estimates of the return to schooling which apply to a 
subgroup of mainly liquidity constrained individuals.  Such estimates may be more 
interesting (at least from a policy perspective) and easier to identify than the return to the 
“average” individual.  Such LATE estimates are particularly useful if they can be 
attributed to the subgroup identified in the experiment. 
 
This evidence, using instruments based on the education reform as well as on 
father’s education, is consistent with most recent (as well as earlier, see Griliches 1977) 
findings, suggesting that the causal effect of education is as big or bigger than what is 
suggested by OLS estimates. 
 
                                                 
3 Results can be made available by the authors upon request.    19  
Instrumental variables estimates will vary depending on which instrument is used 
and estimates may vary widely when heterogeneity is important.  What is important to 
recognize is that the nature of the effect of the instrument on the distribution of returns is 
critical in understanding the estimated coefficient, and may in times be useful in 
bounding the returns in the population. In addition, when the instrument used is the same 
as the policy being studied and the policy is exogenously imposed, the instrument can 
identify the effect of the exogenously imposed policy on the outcome being studied.  
 
 In this paper we followed a potentially promising approach (similar to that by 
Ichino and Winter-Ebmer 1999), where we looked for different instruments that are likely 
to affect different subgroups in the population, by assessing to which part of the returns 
distribution the complier groups belong. 
 
In Venezuela, the returns to schooling based on OLS estimates are rather low. 
However, the IV estimates using the compulsory reform instrument seem to indicate that 
the impact of compulsory schooling may have been benefitial to those who are liquidity-
constrained.  Using natural policy experiments provides a useful assessment of the impact 
of education policies on the targeted groups. 
 
Empirical evidence on developing countries, such as the evidence from this study, 
contributes to our understanding of the effect of education initiatives – which are part of a 
development policy agenda – on certain sections of the population, such as those who are 
liquidity-constrained. The evidence suggests that the returns to schooling for the 
subgroup of individuals affected by education reforms, such as compulsory schooling   20  
laws and decreases in schooling costs (which mainly affect liquidity constrained 
individuals) are significantly higher than the returns to the “average” individual. More 
broadly, development policies need to be properly evaluated, using appropriate control 
groups and experiments, including innovative approaches that take advantage of natural 
policy experiments that lead to data variation. 
   21  
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